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Abstract
International Non-governmental Organizations (INGOs) face difficult choices when choosing to
allocate resources. Given that the resources made available to INGOs fall far short of what is
needed to reduce massive human rights deficits, any chosen scheme of resource allocation requires
failing to reach other individuals in great need. Facing these moral opportunity costs, what moral
reasons should guide INGO resource allocation? Two reasons that clearly matter, and are
recognized by philosophers and development practitioners, are the consequences (or benefit or
harm reduction) of any given resource allocation and the need (or priority) of individual
beneficiaries. If accepted, these reasons should lead INGOs to allocate resources to a limited
number of countries where the most prioritarian weighted harm reduction will be achieved. I make
three critiques against this view. First, on grounds the consequentialist accepts, I argue that INGOs
ought to maintain a reasonably wide distribution of resources. Second, I argue that even if one is a
consequentialist, consequentialism ought not act as an action guiding principle for INGOs. Third,
I argue that additional moral reasons should influence decision making about INGO resource
allocation. Namely, INGO decision making should attend to relational reasons, desert, respect for
agency, concern for equity, and the importance of expressing a view of moral wrongs.
Keywords: poverty; poverty alleviation; NGO; Pogge; distribution; aid; development;
scarcity; donors
The severity and breadth of human deprivation and human rights deficits far
outpaces the resources currently made available to respond to these injustices.
Although official measurements of poverty, human development, and human
rights achievement are contested, some statistics give a rough picture of the size of
the problem. Nearly, a billion people are malnourished, 2.6 billion people live
without access to improved sanitation facilities, and over 800 million live without
access to improved drinking water. 1.5 billion live in countries afflicted by
conflict, and 22,000 children die every day from preventable illness. The odds of a
woman being abused in her lifetime in most countries range between 30 and
60%.1
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To meet this need, in 2010 the USA provided nearly $29 billion in Overseas
Development Assistance, about 0.21% of GNI. Outside of ODA, American citizens
provided $37.5 billion in philanthropic giving to global causes.2 In a world of scarce
resources and great need, International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs)
devoted to securing human rights, alleviating suffering, and combating injustice face
difficult choices in the allocation of scarce resources. In the foreseeable future, the
resources INGOs raise will be entirely inadequate to meet individual need. Given
that INGOs cannot work with everyone, how should they make decisions regarding
resource allocation?
Two important moral reasons that should play a role in decision making about
the distribution INGO resources are the consequences (or benefits or harm
reduction) that any given resource distribution will have and the severity of
deprivation that is reduced. That is, how much harm reduction will occur on the
selected allocation of resources versus competing possible allocations, with greater
weight attributed to benefits that accrue to those who are worse off? But, is that the
only consideration? In this paper, I argue that while consequences should play an
important role in determining the allocation of INGO resources, there are a
number of other moral reasons that should guide INGO resource allocation. These
reasons include concern for equity, claims of moral desert, concern for agency, and
the importance of INGOs expressing a view on moral wrongs.3 I also argue that
even if one is a consequentialist, they ought not endorse consequentialism as an
action guiding principle for INGOs, nor should they endorse restricting INGO
resource allocation to a limited number of morally cost-efficient countries.
‘VALUE FOR MONEY’: CONSEQUENCES AND NEED CLEARLY
MATTER AT COST
When selecting between competing, feasible allocations of resources, one undeniably
significant moral reason that should carry great weight is the consequences (or
benefits or harm reduction) that will accrue per unit of cost as compared to equally
costly alternative resource allocations. Economists have long evaluated the effective-
ness of INGO resource allocation in terms of consequences. Development agencies
are increasingly moving in this direction as well.
Some philosophers have also endorsed the ‘value for money’ approach.4 Thomas
Pogge provides the most rigorous philosophical argument for a broadly consequen-
tialist, prioritarian principle of how INGOs should allocate resources. I, therefore,
take Pogge as the starting point for evaluating the consequentialist position.5
Pogge is reacting to a view held by many INGOs that he calls the distributive
fairness constraint:
They think it unfair to spend more resources on protecting people in some
countries than on protecting people in other countries merely because resources can
be employed more cost-effectively in the former than in the latter. They believe
that, so long as resources can achieve some harm protection in a country, a fair
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share thereof should be allocated to this country even if the same resources could
achieve much more elsewhere.6
Pogge rejects this distributive fairness constraint, and endorses the following
principle:
Other things being equal, an INGO should govern its decision making about
candidate projects by such rules and procedures as are expected to maximize its
long-run cost-effectiveness, defined as the expected aggregate moral value of
the projects it undertakes divided by the expected aggregate cost of these projects.
Here aggregate moral value, or harm protection, is the sum of the moral values of
the harm reductions (and increases) the projects bring about for the individual
persons they affect.7
This principle is spelled out in prioritarian terms, whereby the harm reduction for
worse off people counts more than harm reduction for slightly better-off people.8 For
example, if a particular project could extend one group’s life expectancy from 35 to
45 years, or that of another equally large group from 50 to 62 years, there is greater
moral value achieved by serving the former group even though more life years accrue
to the latter group. On Pogge’s account, therefore, there are initially only two morally
salient reasons that should guide INGO distribution: the need of the individual (how
badly off they are), and the potential harm reduction that can be achieved (how
much better off they become) per unit of cost.
Pogge addresses several deontological concerns that can be raised against his
prioritarian, consequentialist approach. First, Pogge grants that in some cases the
prevention of extinction or the preservation of diversity may count as morally valuable
in addition to the moral value attached to the individual lives affected. Therefore,
these considerations can be factored into the consequentialist’s calculation.9 Second,
Pogge recognizes that different projects may have different probabilities of success.
Again, this can be accommodated by the consequentialist in that projects should be
assessed by dividing the probability-weighted expected moral value by the probability
weighted expected cost. Third, Pogge considers the possibility that INGOs may raise
more money, and thus produce greater moral value, if they accommodate racist or
discriminating contributors’ preferences. Here, Pogge allows that the consequentialist
may give some weight to, for example, the importance of not implementing the
preferences of racist donors in programs, although this would not justify distributing
resources in such a way that would substantially reduce the expected moral value of
the INGO’s work.10 Pogge also grants that small departures from the moral value
maximizing distribution could be justified in deference to the preferences of local
actors on a project, but he largely views this consultation as instrumental to the
success of the project, and such consultation cannot provide normative guidance that
would justify significant departures from moral value maximization.11 Finally, Pogge
recognizes that an INGO’s direct material involvement in harm, or its association
with harms committed by others, may justify deviance from the moral value
maximization calculation.12
Ultimately, Pogge is driven to the broadly prioritarian, consequentialist account by
the awesomeness of the responsibility of the INGO, in that (by his lights) any
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decision made to allocate resources to one area means abandoning people in great
need elsewhere. Because this responsibility is so awesome, any departure from moral
value maximizing distribution that is based on any of the concerns listed above, such
as the preferences of local actors or worries about implementing the preferences of
racist contributors, should be marginal at best. Any departure from the prioritarian,
consequentialist calculation, on Pogge’s account, is tantamount to sentencing some
innocent individuals to greater suffering and possibly death because of a morally
inefficient distribution of resources.
THE MORALLY EFFICIENT SELECTION OF COUNTRIES
One implication of Pogge’s principle for the distribution of resources, in conjunction
with certain facts about the moral efficacy of INGO resource allocation in various
countries, is that large INGOs should not attempt an even moderately equal
distribution of resources across countries:
The existing allocation of funds for harm reduction efforts is highly inefficient; and
concentrating on a few countries would greatly increase what these funds achieve by
way of poverty eradication . . . It seems obvious to me that we should here decide
against the proposed distributive fairness constraint and in favor of protecting more
people. I recognize that, if we concentrate on a few countries, then we will do
nothing to protect many very badly-off people who, through no fault of their own,
live elsewhere. But if we spread our efforts fairly over all developing countries, then
we will do nothing to protect even more people who are just as badly off and just as
free of fault in their fate. Any conceivable allocation of available resources will leave
many people exposed to a life of severe deprivation*people who ought to be
protected. If we cannot fully protect everyone from such harm, then we should at
least achieve as much as possible.13
On this account, working in high cost, difficult-to-succeed countries such as Sudan,
Somalia, Afghanistan, or Burma should be abandoned in favor of low cost and easy
to succeed countries such as India or Ethiopia where more harm reduction can be
achieved per unit of expenditure. Dollar and Collier argue that ‘a poverty-efficient
re-allocation of aid . . . would reduce the average cost of life-long poverty protection
from $2650 to $1387 per person, thus nearly doubling aid impact to save 19.1 rather
than only 10 million people from poverty.’14
There is a further implication, not mentioned by Pogge, that the reduction of some
harms will not be sufficiently morally cost efficient to be included in INGO
programing. For example, if the reduction of sexual violence turns out, on the whole,
to be less morally cost effective than reductions in childhood diseases, programs
seeking to reduce sexual violence should not receive any funding at all.
Pogge, nor anyone else I know of, stipulates an ‘exchange rate’ between various
kinds of harms. He simply asks that INGOs explicitly set such an exchange rate, and
then apply their considerations consistently. To see how this would exclude certain
kinds of harms from INGO operations, consider the following. Suppose Oxfam
decides that, for whatever reasons, preventing one childhood death is equal to
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preventing 1.5 sexual assaults. (Here I assume that the evaluation of the relative
weights of different kinds of harms should precede an assessment of the costs of
preventing these harms.) If they subsequently find that it costs the same amount to
prevent three childhood deaths as it does to prevent one sexual assault, then the
INGO should allocate resources to the prevention of childhood deaths until
the marginal cost of preventing one childhood death rises to the point at which
the same amount of resources could be allocated to the prevention of 1.5 sexual
assaults. Assuming that the INGO expends its entire annual budget before reaching
this point, the INGO ought not include the prevention of sexual assault in any of its
programing.
Pogge’s principle for resource allocation is intuitively plausible. It seems that if
INGOs can more effectively spend their resources elsewhere, everything else being
equal, they ought to do so. And if it turns out that, after applying his formula, certain
countries should be emphasized to the exclusion of others, so be it. But I have, and
I suspect others share, an intuition which pulls in the other direction. Just because a
given project might have a low chance of success, or come at a high cost, this does not
mean we ought not do it*sometimes INGOs should fight the uphill battle, even if it
means not winning other easy victories. Furthermore, it seems odd for INGOs to
restrict the scope of their operations solely on account of the high cost effectiveness of
working in some countries. In what remains of this paper, I argue for these views and
modify Pogge’s account to include a plurality of moral reasons for resource
allocation.
A CONSEQUENTIALIST REVISION IN FAVOR OF A MODERATELY
WIDE ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES
On grounds the consequentialist accepts, a reasonably wide distribution of INGO
resources should be maintained. Moral value maximization will be undermined if the
number of countries in which an INGO works is highly restricted.
Epistemic reasons
Working in a small number of countries limits the epistemic base of an INGO. If Oxfam
only worked in Ethiopia, India, and Bangladesh, they would not learn from interesting
strategies, policies, or development successes in Kenya, Bolivia, or Vietnam.15 INGOs
do not always already know what works best, and the flow of information is not (or at
least ought not) always be from INGOs to poor and oppressed people.16 Rather,
INGOs can learn from the diverse, fluid, and dynamic resistance of poor men and
women and their allies. These learning opportunities can inform the work of the
INGOs, and INGOs are well placed to distribute that knowledge elsewhere.
Second, INGOs cannot always already know who the worst off are without having
a presence in a given area. If there is no Oxfam presence in the Central African
Republic, Oxfam will not know the cost of working there, the degree of deprivation
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people experience, or the odds of having successful operations. Given extensive
cutbacks in the foreign bureaus of major media outlets and the likelihood of
restrictions on national and local media in poor countries with weak or non-existent
human rights protections, INGOs can frequently be the best and first source of
information on deprivation and rights abuses in very poor (and very poorly covered)
areas. Absent some reasonably wide distributional spread of resources, the ability to
identify the most deprived will be weakened.
Institutional capacity
If the limited country thesis is adopted, the institutional capacity to work in certain
countries will diminish. INGOs will no longer employ local experts or have strong,
reliable, trusting relationships with relevant local actors and community members,
including people who understand how the government and political system operates
and have a robust understanding of the local culture and geography.
Perhaps this would not be a significant problem if the degree of deprivation, the
depth of deprivation, and the cost of operating were all fixed. They are not.
Deprivation is fluid and over time some communities and countries may make great
progress, whereas others will regress.17 New countries may become home to the
worst off, and the cost of operating will vary with political and economic change over
time, including but not limited to the high volatility of currency exchange rates and
changing political, economic, and social circumstances on the ground.
Some kinds of disasters may lend themselves to particularly cost-effective harm
reduction, but only if an INGO already has an existing presence in a country. For
example, following the 2010 Pakistani floods, millions of people were in need of
rapid assistance that, if provided, could achieve very large amounts of harm
reduction. INGOs with a strong presence in Pakistan before the floods could scale
up their operations to serve more people more effectively than those who had little or
no presence in the country. But having that prior presence required working in a
country that was very costly because of, among other things, insecurity, limited
infrastructure, and difficult geographic terrain.
Small problems become big problems
Furthermore, some problems that may not be the most morally cost effective for
INGOs at one point in time may become the most morally cost effective in the
future. Small problems in a high cost country may spread to become much bigger
problems. For example, suppose a new disease emerges among livestock in a region
that is hard to access. This might be a problem that would not be cost effective to
address, as compared to other existing problems at the time. But if that disease
spreads to livestock and then to people in a whole region, and it could have been
prevented at a much lower cost with an earlier intervention, then it would be cost
effective to do so. Given the uncertainty of the counterfactual claim about the future
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big problem, it is advisable for INGOs to avoid a narrow distribution of resources (on
grounds the consequentialist accepts).18
Given epistemic concerns, the need for institutional capacity in many countries,
and the possibility for small problems to become big problems, the consequentialist
should, thus, endorse a reasonably wide spread of INGO projects and programs. I do
not endorse the distributive fairness constraint that Pogge rejects, which holds that
INGOs should allocate resources equally among countries. I simply claim that
INGOs ought not always or nearly always avoid working in countries where the
moral value per unit of cost is significantly lower than in the low-cost, high-success
rate countries. This view is certainly consistent with concentrating some larger
amount of resources in more morally cost-efficient countries.
REJECTING CONSEQUENTIALISM AS AN ACTION-GUIDING
PRINCIPLE FOR INGOS
Thus far, we have only shown that the consequentialist ought to endorse a reasonably
wide distribution of resources to various countries, although not allocating resources
equally among countries. In this section, I argue that consequentialism ought not
serve as an action guiding principle for INGOs. Even if one is a committed
consequentialist, one should reject the view that, for example, judges should act as
consequentialists, as opposed to upholding professional obligations to rule based on
evidence, argument, and proper legal interpretation. Similarly, a committed
consequentialist should reject consequentialism as an action-guiding principle for
INGOs.
Implausibility of consequentialism guiding similar institutions
For institutions that have moral foundations similar to INGOs, almost no one thinks
that consequentialism ought to guide their actions. Consider a teacher working in a
very challenging context. (I assume here that the primary although not sole
institutional purpose of schools is to secure a human right to education. It also
bears noting that many INGOs exclusively focus on this human right.) Let us assume
that the school is underfunded, the teacher’s pay is quite low, the students come from
challenging backgrounds, and have had little previous educational training. Let us
also assume that the students are of diverse abilities in two ways: students differ in
their ability to learn (from the teacher’s perspective, there are differential returns on
investment of teacher time) and in their preexisting level of knowledge (some are
worse off than others).
How should this teacher allocate her time in the classroom, assuming that teachers
have some flexibility in the amount of attention they pay to each individual student?
One principle, crudely consequentialist, would require teaching those students who
are best able to learn. The return on investment for the teacher, in terms of
educational outcomes produced, would be highest if they spent the most time on the
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quickest learning students. Another principle, strictly prioritarian, would require that
the teacher should focus on the worst off students, regardless of the speed at which
they learn. A third principle, parallel to Pogge’s prioritarian consequentialism, would
require allocating teacher time based on both the degree of student need and the
student’s capacity for learning, that is, the teacher should focus her attention on the
worst off students who will learn the quickest. A fourth principle, egalitarian (in
terms of output), would require allocating an equal amount of teacher time to each
student.
In this case, adopting any one of the four principles as a strict guide for action is
highly implausible and insensitive to the relevant moral features of the case. It is
implausible to think that students should receive little or no attention because they
do not happen to be the worst students; that students should receive little or no
attention because they do not happen to be the quickest learning students; or that
students should receive little or no attention because they do not happen to be the
quickest learning, worst off students. Suppose that it is twice as costly to educate
students with physical disabilities than other students, due to the costs of making a
school wheelchair accessible, would it be morally permissible for schools to refuse
wheelchair-bound students on account of the cost it takes to educate them? Certainly
not. I do not deny that school administrators and teachers ought to take seriously the
fact that resources spent on students with disabilities draw resources away from other
students. But, I reject the view that these issues should be resolved through a strict
costbenefit analysis.
There are a variety of competing principles that should guide the teacher’s conduct
in this resource-scarce environment. Sometimes, she should spend more time with
students who are struggling (a prioritarian principle). At other times, she should give
more attention to students who, with a little bit of extra help, will make quite a bit of
progress (a consequentialist principle). At other times, she should give attention to
very good students who are doing quite well, as a reward for their interest and work
in the subject (a desert principle). And many times, a teacher should give students
attention when they ask (a respect for agency principle). The teacher would be
conducting herself poorly as a teacher, and failing in her institutional role-based
responsibilities, if she acted on any single moral reason all of the time. If she only
gave individual attention to the worst students, or the quickest learning students, or
the hardest working students, we would think she had failed in her institutional role.
If the reader finds a disanalogy between the case of the teacher and the INGO
because the teacher is already in some relationship with the students that generates
specific duties, then just reconsider the above arguments for school administrators.
Just as the teacher should not act on strictly prioritarian, consequentialist grounds, so
too should the administrators not allocate resources according to those principles. If
the case is considered disanalogous because many schools are a function of the state,
then just imagine that the school is run by an INGO in a resource-scarce
environment. If Oxfam is setting up a school in a rural area in a low income
country, should they seek to only serve the quickest learning, worst off students?
I argue not. This is because there are a plurality of moral reasons that Oxfam should
S. Wisor
34
attend to in establishing this education program, which include but are not limited to
the need of individuals and the benefit they will receive from the program.
Implausibility of consequentialism guiding INGOs
Not only is it implausible for consequentialism to guide institutions similar to
INGOs, it is implausible for consequentialism to serve as a public, action-guiding
principle for INGOs. The best work in development studies suggests that INGOs
and donors are at their best when they do not act as consequentialists. INGOs must
not treat individuals as mere units of consumption and production, but as human
beings, agents with inherent value and dignity, bearers of rights and responsibilities,
that face difficult choices in the context of scarce resources and an unjust world.
Their employees, with a significant dose of humility, must think of themselves as
partners, working with others to combat injustice and deprivation. Such an approach
requires that individuals not be treated based solely on their degree of need or the
cost of providing harm protection.19
If INGOs act as consequentialists, they may encounter a host of serious problems.
They would constantly be striving to perform according to consequences that would
lead to grabbing the lowest hanging fruit, doing those things that are easiest to
accomplish and measure. Building schools is easily done and easily measur-
ed*building democracies and securing rights is difficult to do and difficult to
measure.20 There would be an institutional reluctance to innovate or try projects that
might fail, as employees would be uncertain of achieving harm reduction. It might
also lead to shifting priorities, and thus unreliability in the delivery of aid, as the costs
of operation and the harm reduction achieved frequently change. It would encourage
the constant monitoring of the consequences of INGO activity, at the cost of
undermining the very ends served by that activity.21 Finally, and arguably most
importantly, it would undermine the importance of cultivating relationships of
mutual respect and accountability that are arguably necessary for development
success, and are intrinsically valuable.
The consequentialist might argue that a rights-based approach to development is
consistent with a broadly consequentialist allocation of resources. In order for this to
work, INGOs would need a kind of two-tiered structure, with consequentialist
managers and non-consequentialist employees. Managers would judge people and
projects based on their moral cost effectiveness, whereas dictating to the other
employees that they do the opposite. In addition to being self-effacing, such an
approach would be unlikely to be effective in the actual workplace. Staff would be
aware of budget allocation, and managers would need to provide some such
justification. This would require either admitting to the consequentialist approach,
which is inconsistent with the rights-based approach, or lying. Furthermore, even if
such justification could be provided to (and accepted by) INGO employees, there is a
great deal of evidence that institutional leadership influences behavior through-
out institutions. When generals make torture seem permissible, privates torture.
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When executives at financial institutions fail to promote risk management, low level
traders take greater risks. And similarly, we can expect if INGOs are run by
consequentialists, their employees will be consequentialists as well.
An example
Consider Human Rights Watch (HRW). The institutional purpose of Human Rights
Watch is to defend and protect human rights, increasingly including economic and
social rights. As an institution that is explicitly tasked with human rights protection,
the organization must make decisions regarding resource allocation that are guided
by this institutional purpose. Consider two kinds of cases that a human rights
organization might confront.
First, some kinds of rights violations affect a very small number of people, are very
costly to address, and have low chances of success. Such cases include objecting to the
imprisonment of political prisoners and campaigning against the death penalty.
Human Rights Watch spends a significant amount of time and resources opposing the
death penalty in the USA. In 2010, 45 people were executed in the USA.22 Progress
has been slow in the political and legal battle to abolish the death penalty. The
consequentialist should object to the persistent allocation of resources to this cause:
Human Rights Watch (HRW) could find other areas where much larger numbers of
individuals are affected, and the chances of bringing about positive change are greater.
I, however, agree that HRW should persist in their anti-death penalty campaigning. To
abandon this project is to abandon the fundamental ideals that are in my mind central
to human rights advocacy. To defend human rights is, in part, to disregard the
importance of the cost of protecting these rights or the likelihood of succeeding.
Respecting rights means acting in a way that is consistent with those rights being
invaluable, things that ought not be traded away for some other more advantageous
arrangement.
Second, some kinds of rights violations may be politically unpopular to address,
and thus harmful to the long-run fund raising and effectiveness of an organization.
Two recent examples highlight this clearly. Human Rights Watch’s work on Israel
frequently raises criticism from a variety of prominent public figures in the USA.23
Amnesty International was highly criticized after an employee, Gita Seghal, publicly
criticized the organization for its work with Moazzam Begg, a former prisoner at
Guantanamo Bay, for his alleged (but unproven) opposition to women’s rights and
support of terrorism.24 In both cases, each institution risked significant financial and
political support by taking controversial stands that they deemed consistent with
their mandate of protecting and promoting human rights, arguably reducing their
overall effectiveness (from the consequentialist point of view). If Amnesty and
Human Rights Watch had abandoned their work in these areas (or, alternatively,
selected not to do it in the first place) after conducting a costbenefit analysis, they
would have been acting in a way that is entirely inconsistent with their institutional
purpose. Human rights organizations ought not abandon (or fail to take on) a given
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cause because it is politically unpopular or costly to defend it. To be a human rights
defender is in part to defend human rights especially when it is unpopular to do so,
even if more harm protection could be achieved in the long run by abandoning, or
failing to take up, these unpopular cases.
FURTHER NORMATIVE CHALLENGES FOR THE
CONSEQUENTIALIST ACCOUNT
In addition to being in practice a poor internal principle for INGO conduct,
consequentialism as a principle to guide INGO resource allocation faces a number of
theoretical objections that will be familiar to the reader as common objections to
(at least some forms of) consequentialism.
Justification to those who are not aided, or simply justification
One might think that INGOs must be able to justify their decisions to those who are
not beneficiaries of their programs. Pogge argues that it would be quite difficult to
justify to 5000 potential aid recipients that they had been abandoned because 1000
aid recipients somewhere else helped an INGO keep a wide distribution of resources
across countries.25 But is it the case that INGOs must provide justification to those
they do not aid, to their opportunity cost victims?
I had the privilege several years ago to work with a group of young people, mostly
students, who were highly engaged in advocacy surrounding the genocide in Darfur,
Sudan. Almost all of their non-academic time was devoted to activism. Did these
students have to justify their choice of action to people suffering elsewhere? If they
could have produced more moral value by working on a different campaign, should
they have done so? Many students became involved for personal reasons*including
deep regret about US conduct during the Rwandan genocide and familial
connections to the Holocaust. Even if the students could have achieved even more
harm reduction by working on some other problem, such as child labor or neglected
diseases or gender-based violence, it does not follow that either (a) they should have
done so or (b) failure to do so deserves moral condemnation. Furthermore, it is not
the case that those students owed any justification specifically to child laborers or
victims of neglected diseases or gender-based violence as to why they were instead
spending their time on anti-genocide activism.26 Rather, they owed a justification in
general that appeals to certain kinds of moral reasons. This is a very fine, but in my
mind maintainable, distinction. There is a difference between justifying a given
resource allocation as a morally justifiable choice, and justifying it as against all
competing alternative choices to the potential beneficiaries of those alternative
resource schemes. In the former justification, alternative feasible allocations and their
consequences will bear some weight in the process of allocating resources. In the
latter, those alternative allocations and their consequences bear nearly all the moral
weight. This is the move I hope to resist. I grant, however, two points. First, the
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(prioritarian adjusted) consequences of alternative resource allocation schemes are
morally significant and thus bear some moral weight in the decision-making process.
Second, there are certainly some circumstances in which a justification is owed to
one’s opportunity cost victims. These would likely be cases in which the opportunity
cost victims had some determinate claim or reasonable expectation of assistance
directed at a particular institution. However, even in these cases, there still may be a
plurality of moral reasons that could justify to the opportunity cost victims the reason
that they were not benefiting from the project.
We can see this clearly if we examine other instances of development assistance
that are not moral value maximizing. Consider a doctor working on a very serious
disease (say, tuberculosis), but not the most serious disease, in a very poor place (say,
Kenya), but not the world’s poorest place. Even if suffering people have a general
claim for assistance against wealthy individuals, surely this particular doctor is
discharging her duty to poor people. She does not need to justify her decision to work
on tuberculosis to people with malaria, and she does not need to justify her decision
to people suffering in Malawi. Even if Malawians do have a claim for assistance, it
strikes me as implausible that the doctor needs to justify her decision to them. And it
strikes me as implausible that we want to say that the doctor should really be doing
more than she is to reduce suffering.
Just as is the case with individuals, INGOs do not have to be able to justify their
decisions regarding resource allocation to all those they fail to aid.27 If an INGO is
established to reduce the number of fistulas, it need not justify that decision to people
with river blindness. Furthermore, their institutional duty to alleviate suffering
associated with fistulas is discharged just insofar as the INGO reduces a large
number of fistulas (assuming their conduct is otherwise morally acceptable). It is
neither the case that they have not discharged their duty, nor that they ought to be
doing otherwise, if they could reduce more suffering by working on a different
disease, or if they could reduce more suffering from that disease by working with
different patients who are more ‘cost effective.’ In particular, they do not have to
explain why some smaller number of people had access to their services because of
distributional decisions. They simply have to be able to justify their decisions with
reference to morally plausible reasons, weighed according to some reasonable
procedure or other.28
This has great implications for the most forceful argument in Pogge’s article. He
appeals to the awesomeness of the responsibility of considering who will live and who
will die in distributing INGO resources. But if it is the case that an INGO does not
need to justify its distribution of resources to those that it does not serve, then the
concern that motivates the consequentialist approach loses some (but not all) force.
It is only when the INGO must explain to those who will otherwise die if the INGO
does not distribute its resources in the most moral value maximizing way that we are
drawn to the consequentialist approach. Because we do not owe such a justification
when we are discharging our duty to prevent harm, the motivation for the
consequentialist approach is weakened.
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Incommensurability
The harm reductions that an INGO seeks to achieve are pluralist and, in many
cases, incommensurable. If you could prevent one hundred rapes, or prevent 30
deaths from malaria, which is morally better? There is no decisively correct
answer to these questions. Of course, INGOs and policy makers still do have to
think about the relative size of budgets for public health and gender based
violence, but such decisions ought not be reached though a mathematical
equation*weighing the costs of the proposed activities against the moral value
of their achievements.
The consequentialist might respond that despite the incommensurability of
various harms, within any given area of harm reduction one can easily apply a moral
cost-benefit analysis. The INGO that works on basic sanitation, for example, can still
assess its basic sanitation projects just in terms of the moral value in basic sanitation
versus the cost of the project. More people with access to basic sanitation is better
than fewer. It need not concern itself with cross-harm comparisons. But this merely
moves the problem a further step back. Even if it easy to apply the cost-benefit
formula within the sanitation sector, INGOs must still ask what percentage of their
resources should go to this sector versus others. If an anti-poverty INGO does not
work in multiple sectors, it must still justify its single-sector focus when it could
allocate resources elsewhere.
The consequentialist might argue that despite the incommensurability of various
kinds of harm reduction, public policy makers (and people suffering these
deprivations) must make decisions regarding incommensurable dimensions of
deprivation with great frequency. Eventually, any action guiding reasons will have
to address, either explicitly or implicitly, the incommensurability of harms. We accept
and encourage governments, for example, to work to reduce deprivations in
education, sanitation, physical safety and consumption, even though putting
resources into any one area means not putting those resources into another area. It
may be that we would always sacrifice an additional day of school to save a life
through more health care provisions, but this does not mean that we advocate
abandoning all education spending until every possibly preventable death has been
averted. The question is thus whether incommensurability presents a greater
challenge for the consequentialist than for other accounts. I believe it does, as
the consequentialist explicitly requires the summing of harm protection to guide
resource allocation. This is exactly how an INGO must decide on resource
distribution on the consequentialist account. On the account I offer, the INGO’s
primary aim is the moral end it has set for itself. If the INGO has committed to
combating human rights abuses, for example, then its distribution of resources across
incommensurable harms does not require an appeal to the value of each of those
harms, but rather an appeal to whether such an allocation is consistent with its moral
ends and the moral reasons it can plausibly appeal to.
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Inequality
The consequentialist prescriptions might also countenance exacerbating pre-existing
group-based inequalities. For example, if the cost of getting boys decent education
were lower than for girls, INGOs should spend exclusively on boys education. Or if it
is more expensive to work in remote areas inhabited by indigenous populations, then
no INGO resources should support indigenous peoples (assuming an equal number
of non-indigenous people are equally badly off) and the already extensive gaps
between indigenous and non-indigenous achievement should continue to grow.
The consequentialist can respond in one of two ways. First, one could reject that
equality is inherently valuable, and therefore accept the implication that INGO
resources should sometimes be distributed in very unequal ways just as long as such
inequalities do not have negative long-run consequences. Pogge asks us to imagine a
hypothetical INGO distributing food aid in an emergency which must select who
should be the recipient of aid, knowing that those who do not receive assistance may
die. He also stipulates that more people will be saved who have the lowest caloric
needs, and many women have lower caloric needs than men. ‘Facing this question,
I think we ought to apply optimizing selection rules to the situation. We ought to
protect 20 men and 65 women, for example, if doing so enables 85 people to survive
instead of the 80 that would survive if we chose to protect equal numbers of men and
women.’29
In this case I have an intuition that INGOs ought not save more people if
marginally more survivors results in much greater inequity. Would we want to say
that the INGO should only protect 1 adult man and save 84 women if doing so would
produce the most survivors? Or suppose 100 black people and 100 white people need
food aid, and we only have enough for 100 people, and all of the white people happen
to have lower caloric needs than all of the black people. I would argue we should save
fewer total people to avoid saving all of the white people and none of the black
people. Or, suppose in some other hypothetical case, it is cheaper to serve men than
women. Should a program target 100% men and 0% women if this is what the math
tells us to do? I find this highly implausible, and I suspect others would as well.30
How can we justify this intuition? We need to appeal to concerns that extend beyond
individual need and harm reduction. We must appeal to concern for group-based
inequalities. Such concern can be reflected both in the allocation of INGO resources
(that is, with a concern for unequally distributing resources so as to privilege some
groups over others) and in the outcomes (that is, concern for a state of affairs in
which some groups are disproportionately deprived).
The importance of addressing inequality can be seen more clearly if we remove the
weight of lives lost from the hypothetical example. Suppose that an INGO seeks to
provide decent sanitation facilities. It can reach 100 urban non-indigenous people
per project or reach 75 rural indigenous people, all of whom are equally badly off,
and equally in need of sanitation facilities. It seems plausible that if the indigenous
group has been subject to systematic deprivation and is on the whole at least as badly
off as other groups in the country, it is plausible to allocate the sanitation project to
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the indigenous rural area rather than to the urban area, even though doing so would
create less overall harm reduction.
The consequentialist could respond that equality (of the kind I am concerned
with) is itself a valuable thing that can be included in moral cost benefit analysis. If
so, then consequentialists would have reasons to grant that considerations of equality
should influence distributions of resources across populations (including across
countries, across genders, across ethnicities, etc.) While I would welcome this move,
this very broad consequentialism must then accommodate a host of other morally
significant factors (such as desert and agency).
Alternatively, the consequentialist might respond that any distribution of resources
is unequal, in so far as some people are recipients and others are not. But this misses
the point of the objection. Some distributions of resources will exacerbate pre-
existing inequalities between morally salient groups (such as indigenous and non-
indigenous people) while other distributive choices will combat these inequalities.
Deontological or teleological accounts of INGO resource distribution can justify
explicitly combating pre-existing inequalities, even when doing so would have less
moral value for badly off individuals than would alternative resource allocation
schemes.
Applicability
Finally, the long run moral value maximization calculation is particularly difficult to
make, and it would be almost paralyzing to try to act on this principle. Imagine the
foreseeable but nearly impossible to predict events that will change the moral value
maximization calculation in the coming years: a tsunami hits; war breaks out; a
government changes hands; a new drug is released, and so on. The inputs for the
moral value calculation are constantly changing, and any serious long run projections
will be riddled with uncertainty.
The consequentialist might object that a decision procedure should be employed
that takes account of epistemic uncertainty about the moral value calculation in the
future. (Pogge explicitly builds in a probability weighted component to his
prioritarian, consequentialist principle). Alternatively, the consequentialist could
simply argue for projects in those areas and sectors that have the lowest degree of
future uncertainty. Furthermore, the consequentialist might respond that any
account of how INGOs should act will face difficulties in applicability.
On the applicability problem, deontological, teleological, and pluralist positions
fare better. Given that in many cases one cannot know the consequences of a given
resource allocation, and in many more cases one does not know the likely
consequences, other theories will fare much better, in that some higher degree of
certainty can be achieved in knowing whether the resource allocation is consistent
with the moral reasons that are identified as relevant for consideration. Uncertainty
about future consequences is simply less troublesome for non-consequentialist
theories that appeal to a plurality of moral reasons.
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MORAL REASONS TO GUIDE INGO RESOURCE ALLOCATION
There are a number of moral reasons that should influence resource allocation and
moral priorities for INGOs.31 In no particular order, I list seven reasons here.
The first two are already recognized by the prioritarian consequentialist. First,
individuals’ need, or amount of harm currently suffered, is a relevant moral
consideration in resource allocation. Second, the consequences (or benefit or harm
reduction) that accrue to those individuals are a relevant moral consideration.
The third is equity. INGOs cannot reach every individual, or provide every
individual access to their resources. INGO resource allocation cannot be equitable in
the sense that each receives an equal amount, or each receives in proportion to her
need or desert. But INGO resource allocation can be governed in part by equity in
another sense: everything else being equal, an INGO’s resource allocation should be
designed to attempt to not exacerbate existing (horizontal or vertical) inequalities,
and, when possible, should reduce these inequalities. That is, if an INGO is selecting
between assisting two groups in equal need, but one is systematically disadvantaged
in the society and another is not, concern for equity would move the decision in favor
of reducing horizontal inequalities.
The fourth is relational. INGOs may have greater reasons to operate in certain
areas either as reparation for harms that they have committed or as reparation for
harms committed by others to which they are morally connected. In the first kind of
case, an INGO may have harmed people through their own conduct, either directly
or indirectly. In these cases, as Pogge argues, the INGO has a very strong reason,
almost always decisive, to make reparations to those they have harmed.
There is a different kind of harming relationship, also recognized by Pogge in his
recommendations for INGO resource allocation and the centerpiece of his global
justice project, that might guide INGO resource allocation. In some cases, an INGO
may bear some kind of associative duties of reparation to individuals whose harm
they did not cause. For example, US-based INGOs may have greater reason to
provide assistance to refugees from the Iraq war than other INGOs. Because they are
based in the USA, funded largely by US donors, and presumably employing a large
number of Americans, even if these INGOs have not committed any harm (and may
have even advocated against the harms that some people suffered), they may be a
vehicle through which duties of reparation are discharged. US-based INGOs may,
therefore, give greater weight to the suffering of Iraqi refugees given the USA role in
the harm they suffered.32
There may be a third kind of relational reason that INGOs may bring to bear on
their resource allocation decision making. They may take into account other
relational connections to a particular harm even if the INGO has no direct or
indirect causal relationship to the harm suffered. For example, the American Jewish
World Service (AJWS) has been a forceful advocate for genocide prevention. There is
no clear harming relationship, either direct or indirect, between AJWS and victims in
Sudan. But, the organization, given its explicitly religious makeup, does have an
associational relationship with genocide. It, therefore, strikes me as entirely plausible
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for AJWS to invoke this relationship as one kind of moral reason to justify allocating
greater resources toward genocide prevention, even if such allocations have less
moral efficiency than other alternative allocations. This associational reason can
justify at least some departure from maximizing moral harm reduction.
The fifth is desert. Desert may be morally significant for INGOs in two distinct
ways: first, they may consider suffering-based desert. Some individuals or groups may
be more deserving of INGO resources than others because they have been victims of
great injustice, or suffered in distinctive or especially morally abhorrent ways even if
they are not as badly off as others. For example, survivors of the Holocaust may have
been deserving of support from INGOs even if, following the end of World War II,
many other people on earth were worse off than they were. INGOs should also take
account of effort-based desert. Some individuals and groups are deserving of INGO
resources in virtue of their efforts to combat injustice, secure rights, and improve
well-being. For example, there was no period in which black South Africans were the
worst off people on the planet. Nonetheless, the mere fact of a strong anti-apartheid
movement combating gross racial injustice was a significant, stand alone moral
reason to support black South Africans and their allies in the struggle against
apartheid. They were deserving, not only as victims of injustice but also as agents
organizing against injustice.
This leads us to the sixth normatively significant consideration, agency. The degree
to which a project or resource allocation respects the agency of individuals is in itself
morally significant, independent of the instrumental value of respecting partner
agency. Agency can influence INGO distribution in two countervailing ways. First, if
a particular project is opposed by its intended beneficiaries, then this is a near-
decisive reason to reject the distribution, even if the foreseeable consequences of the
project are still very good. Second, if a particular individual or group of individuals
has organized and called for support of a particular campaign or project, this is a
morally significant reason to support them. Such solidarity with organized activists
resisting their own oppression should be encouraged by INGO resource allocation.
There is one final moral reason that deserves consideration. There is an expressive
component to moral action that is frequently overlooked. The allocation of INGO
resources should not be evaluated simply by only what that allocation achieves but
also by what it says. When INGOs allocate resources to a given project, sector, or
advocacy effort, they should be concerned not only with the likely outcomes that will
be produced but the moral statement that is made by that allocation.33 External
human rights advocacy against violations of civil and political rights in China, for
example, seems to have had very little effect on the conduct of the Chinese
government. But, despite this low probability of success, INGOs should allocate
resources to human rights advocacy on China simply to morally condemn those
human rights violations, and to call on others to join in this condemnation.34
The consequentialist can respond that each of these reasons requires privileging
certain groups (based on agency, desert, or the desire to condemn moral wrongs) at
the cost of not allocating resources to other projects and programs that would result
in much more harm reduction for badly off individuals. When I recommend
How should INGOs allocate resources?
43
allocating resources to the condemnation of Chinese human rights abuses with the
expectation that very little change will occur in the country, I do so at the expense of
potentially very morally cost-effective harm reduction elsewhere. And, these reasons
(need and harm reduction achieved) certainly should carry significant weight.
I merely intend to suggest that there may be other moral reasons that can justify some
further deviation from the prioritarian, consequentialist principle for resource
allocation than can help explain INGO resource allocation toward projects that are
more costly, or less likely to succeed than alternative allocations.
CONCLUSION
Like Pogge, I am not convinced this settles the discussion. But, I hope to have given a
credible case for thinking (a) that although INGOs ought not endorse the distributive
fairness constraint, they ought to maintain a reasonably wide allocation of resources
and (b) that a plurality of moral reasons should be brought to bear on the question of
how INGOs should allocate resources. What I have not done here is to provide any
information on how these pluralist reasons can be weighed against each other to
make decisions regarding resource allocation. At a minimum, INGOs should give
some weight to each of the reasons, and be transparent in the reasons they provide for
any given resource allocation.
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34. There is a second class of context-related reasons that deserve consideration, although I
cannot give them full treatment here. First, the political and practical feasibility of a
particular project or program matters. Second, concern with institutional displacement or
corrosion of state institutions (the only institutions that can properly guarantee rights) might
deter any particular INGO resource allocation. Third, INGOs ought not work in certain
areas if it brings too much risk of serious harm to either their employees or local
communities.
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